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OPINION PIECE
REFORMING EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE
AFTER KELO: SAFEGUARDING THE FAMILY FARM
Beau Pemberton*
Introduction
Take a journey back in time to the summer of 2005.
Visualize a seventy-five year old, widowed grandmother
living on her farm in rural Middle Tennessee. This thirty-
acre farm in the middle of the county is all that she has left
to call her own. The world has grown around her farm for
many years, inviting mini-malls, restaurants, condomi-
niums, and interstate ramps on all sides of this picturesque
setting. Now, imagine the grandmother's shock when she
receives a letter from the local Economic Development
Board notifying her that it is going to condemn her property
via eminent domain as part of the county's Master Eco-
nomic Redevelopment Plan.
The letter states that her land will serve as the relo-
cation site for a major automobile manufacturer, which will
bring eight hundred new jobs and nearly $2 million a year
in new tax revenues to the economically distressed county.
This redevelopment plan provides the public purpose that
justifies taking the land by eminent domain. Developers'
attractive monetary offers caused her former neighbors to
sell out and move away, but because the grandmother had
* J.D. candidate, University of Tennessee College of Law, graduating in
May, 2008, with a Concentration in Business Transactions; B.A.,
summa cum laude, 2005, The University of Tennessee at Martin. The
author would like to thank Dr. Otis Stephens, and his assistants, for
their invaluable guidance and input on this essay. The author dedicates
this essay to his wife, Stacey, and daughter, Sarah Elizabeth, and ex-
presses his thanks for their support and patience while writing this
piece.
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emotional ties to the property, she was determined to spend
the rest of her life on her farm. She was hardly reassured
by the promise that she would receive just compensation
for her taken property.
After recovering from the initial shock of the letter,
she visits her lawyer to determine her options. The lawyer
tells her that little can be done to stop the taking of her land
for this economic redevelopment plan or to stop the bull-
dozers that will make way for the new automobile factory.
Her only realistic recourse is to litigate over the amount of
money she will receive for her land and for the resulting
displacement from her home. This news is cold comfort to
her because it means that she will be forced to live out her
days somewhere else.
The above described scenario is similar to the expe-
rience of property owners in New London, Connecticut.
Their challenge to the taking of their property for economic
redevelopment purposes led to the 2005 landmark decision,
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), and
resulted in a ripple effect that is currently reforming emi-
nent domain law throughout the United States. To appre-
ciate how Kelo has affected Tennessee's eminent domain
law, the decision must be examined in detail.
Kelo v. City of New London's Facts
The Kelo litigation began when Susette Kelo, as
well as several of her neighbors in the Fort Trumbull area
of New London, Connecticut, challenged the taking of their
property under an economic redevelopment plan (Plan)
implemented by New London Development Corporation
(NLDC) and the City of New London (City).' The Plan's
original purposes were "to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to
increase tax.. . revenues, and to revitalize an economically
1 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005).
2
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distressed city."' 2  Several factors encouraged this Plan
including (1) the 1996 closing of the United States Gov-
ernment's Naval Undersea Warfare Center, located in the
Fort Trumbull area; (2) a city unemployment rate double of
that for all of Connecticut; and (3) a decreased city popula-
tion.3 The Plan intended to use the taken property for "the
creation of a Fort Trumbull State Park" on the former site
of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center; a $300 million
research facility for Pfizer, Inc., adjacent to the park; land
for a new Coast Guard Museum; and property set aside for
residential, commercial, retail, parking, and other purpos-
es.
4
During the Plan's initial stages, NLDC hosted a "se-
ries of neighborhood meetings to educate the public about
the process"' 5 and eventually won approval from state offi-
cials who determined that the plan "was consistent with
relevant state and municipal development policies." 6 After
state approval, NLDC finalized the Plan by focusing on a
ninety-acre tract in the Fort Trumbull area of New Lon-
don.7 In January 2000, New London's city council ap-
proved the Plan's final version and authorized NLDC to
acquire the Fort Trumbull property by purchase or by emi-
nent domain. 8  After purchase negotiations with Susette
2 Id. at 472.
3 Id. at 473.
4 Id. at 473-74. The Court notes that NLDC was attempting to capital-
ize on Pfizer's new research facility as a catalyst to meet the redeve-
lopment plan's original purposes of creating newjobs, tax revenues,
and New London's eventual revitalization. Id. at 473.
5 Id. at 473.
6 Id. at 473-74 n.2. Given the nature of this case, I wonder just how
effective the public meetings held by NLDC were at addressing con-
cems of the affected landowners.71d. at 474.
8 ld. at 475.
3
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Kelo and her neighbors failed, NLDC initiated proceedings
to take their property by eminent domain. 9
After the eminent domain declaration by NLDC,
Kelo and several of her neighbors filed an action against
NLDC in state court and alleged that the taking was un-
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution because the taking violated the Fifth
Amendment's "'public use' restriction."'" NLDC then
announced that it would enter into leasing agreements with
private companies, including Corcoran Jennison, to develop
the property.11 This arrangement appeared to be a harmless
way to meet the Plan's goals, but it essentially condemned
private land for the benefit of private individuals and de-
velopers. This arrangement strengthened the petitioner's
argument because the authors of the Fifth Amendment
presumably did not envision the taking of private land for
private use.
After a bench trial before the New London Superior
Court, the petitioners obtained a permanent restraining
order to prevent the taking of Parcel 4-A, but they lost
regarding Parcel 3.12 The petitioners appealed this incom-
plete victory to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
sustained all the takings at issue. 13 First, the court upheld
the takings on statutory grounds, noting that the state's
9 d. Specifically, petitioners owned a total of fifteen properties in the
Fort Trumbull area, with four of the properties located in Parcel 3 of
the Plan, immediately north of the proposed Pfizer facility and eleven
of the properties located in Parcel 4-A of the Plan. Id. at 474. Parcel 3
was slated for office space, and Parcel 4-A was slated for a park or
manna usage. Id. at 476.
'01 Id. at 475.
11d. at 476 n.4.
Id. at 475-76. The Court notes that this trial on the proposed takings
was a bench trial, which raises the question: Why did the petitioners not
demand a jury trial regarding the proposed takings because a jury
would likely have been more sympathetic to a landowner's concerns
than a governmental agency's plan? See id. at 475.
1Id. at 476.
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municipal development code expressed a clear legislative
determination that land taken for economic redevelopment,
regardless of whether it is developed, is still "a 'public use'
and in the 'public interest."' ' 14 Next, the court, adhering to
federal precedent, sustained the takings for the Plan's pro-
nounced public use. 15 Finally, the court analyzed whether
the takings were "'reasonably necessary' to achieving the
City's intended public use" and "whether the takings were
for 'reasonably foreseeable needs."" 6 This analysis pro-
duced a mixed result.
The three dissenting justices discussed the City's
failure to adduce evidence of future economic benefits
flowing from the Plan and the proposed takings. 17 The
dissent maintained that this lack of evidence should have
invalidated all of NLDC's takings as unconstitutional, de-
spite the Plan's intent "to serve a valid public use."" The
dissenting justices stated that a "'heightened' standard of..
review" was needed to evaluate these takings because
they were purely for economic redevelopment instead of
the typical eminent domain purposes (e.g. roads or parks). 19
Upon granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
observed that the main issue was "whether a city's decision
to take property for ...economic development satisfies"
the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement.
2 0
14 id.
15 Id. (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Ber-
man v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).16 See id.
17 Id. at 477.
18 id.
19 Id.
20 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 ("[N]or shall private proper-
ty be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
5
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The State of the Law before Kelo v. City of New London
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Kelo
is by no means a groundbreaking decision. For several
decades, the Court has maintained that whether a taking
satisfies the Fifth Amendment's public purpose require-
ment requires deference to legislative judgments governing
this area.2 1 The first landmark case in this area was Ber-
man v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), which the Court handed
down over fifty years ago.22 Berman dealt with a redeve-
lopment plan in Washington, D.C., and the plan for this
"blighted area" condemned the existing structures, includ-
ing Berman's department store, to make way for roads,
schools, and other public structures. 23 The rest of the con-
demned property was leased back to private parties for
further development, including low-income housing.
24
Berman parallels Kelo in that the petitioner challenged the
taking as inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment's public
use clause because another private party would eventually
control and redevelop the taken property.25
The Court's unanimous decision deferred to legisla-
tive determinations on what constituted a valid public use
under the Fifth Amendment. 26  The Court, speaking
through Justice William 0. Douglas, stated that it had no
right to overrule a public use determination because "Con-
21 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
22 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 26 (1954).
231Id. at 28-31.
24 Id. This redevelopment plan arose "under the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act of 1945," which sought to eliminate blighted and
slum residential areas of the District as a way of fostering new and
publicly acceptable development. Id. at 28.
5 Id. at 31. Petitioner contended that taking his purely commercial
property (i.e. a department store) was inconsistent with the plan's stated
purpose of "ridding the area" of residential slum property and that
creating a "better balanced, more attractive community" is not a valid
public purpose to sustain the Act. Id.
Id. at 33.
6
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gress and its authorized agencies" had decided that this
redevelopment plan met several, well-established public
purposes, consistent with its police power function. 27 Fur-
thermore, the Court refused to dictate "the means of execut-
ing the [plan]" and noted that the plan's execution was
within the sole discretion of the legislature, including the
use of private enterprise for implementing the plan.28 Ber-
man should have been instructive to the Kelo petitioners
because both cases involved takings for public uses that
were less concrete than in a typical takings case.
29
Next, the Court discussed Hawaii Housing Authori-
ty v. Midkff, 469 U.S. 229 (1984), a landmark takings deci-
sion. Midkiff focused on the constitutionality of the
Hawaiian government condemning and taking residential
rental property from private landlords and transferring fee
simple title to the existing lessee living on the property.
30
The public purpose of Hawaii's law, titled the Land Reform
Act of 1967, was to break up the property oligopoly of a
relatively small number of individual landowners in Ha-
waii.31 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
holding that the statute was "a naked attempt ... of Hawaii
27 Id. at 32-35.
Id. at 33-34 ("We cannot say that public ownership is the sole me-
thod of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment
?rojects.").
For example, a typical takings case would likely involve the appropr-
iation of private land for a tangible public good, such as an interstate or
a post office. Berman's redevelopment plan, which included concrete
elements such as streets and parks as part of its public purpose, also
included less tangible and arguably more abstract elements such as
"prevent[ing], reduce[ing], or eliminate[ing] ... blight." Id. at 29.
Kelo's Plan followed a similar path because its public purposes in-
cluded parks and other public facilities and increased tax revenues and
economic revitalization. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 474 (2005).30 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984).
31 Id. at 232-33.
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to take the private property of A and transfer it to B solely
for B's private use and benefit."
32
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated that
"[t]he 'public use' requirement is. . . coterminous with the
scope of a sovereign's police powers" and that redistribut-
ing land and effectively eliminating an undesirable land
oligopoly via a compensated taking is clearly within a
state's police power justifying the use of eminent domain.
33
The Court maintained that its role of reviewing legislative
determinations of public use was "'an extremely narrow'
one." 34 Reaffirming prior decisions, the Court stated that it
would not substitute its judgment for legislative determina-
tions of a public use "'unless the use [is] palpably without
reasonable foundation."' 35 The Court asserted that its focus
was not on the end-result behind the taking, but strictly on
the plan's public purpose for the takings and whether the
means for the plan's execution were rational.36
In closing, the Court reiterated its position that the
Fifth Amendment does not impose "any literal requirement
that condemned property be put into use for the general
public." 37 Specifically, the Court stated, "It is not essential
that the entire community, nor even any considerable por-
tion,.., directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in
order [for it] to constitute a public use." 38  In short, the
Court determined that the Hawaii statute, which utilized
32 Id. at 235.
33 Id. at 240-42.
34 Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).35 Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160
U.S. 668, 680 (1896)); see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-35.36 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242-43. In addition, the Court stated that debat-
ing the wisdom of takings legislation and its attending public purposes
is improper in the federal courts.37 Id. at 244.38 Id. (quoting Rindge Co. v. L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923)).
8
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eminent domain, "pass[es] scrutiny of the Public Use
Clause."
39
In essence, both Berman and Midkiff set a deferen-
tial tone for the Court's review in takings cases when ex-
amining what constitutes a valid public use. The Kelo
Court, following this deferential tone, abandoned any idea
that the stated legislative purposes behind eminent domain
takings are simply post hoc rationalizations of the taking.
40
Interestingly, both Berman and Midkiff provide considera-
ble latitude to the possibility of private owners becoming
both the end-users and owners of property taken from their
neighbors by eminent domain.
These cases demonstrate that Kelo is not earth-
shattering takings jurisprudence, despite two decades sepa-
rating Midkiff and Kelo and over fifty years dividing Ber-
man and Kelo. The effects of Kelo have been aggrandized
because of an age in which newspapers, twenty-four hour
news channels, and internet news websites report and often
sensationalize stories, including United States Supreme
Court decisions. 4 1 The majority opinion in Kelo, while not
jurisprudentially novel, follows the past decisions of Ber-
man and Midkiff by holding that the taking of the petition-
39 d. at 243.
40 See Brief for the States of Vermont et. al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondents, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(No. 04-108) (highlighting several states' positions, including Tennes-
see, that the courts should give deferential treatment to state determina-
tions of public use in takings cases and limit interference in this area by
the federal courts. This limited influence prevents unnecessary judicial
entanglement and is established precedent in the Court's takings juri-
sprudence).
41See e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Taking Property for
Development, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at Al; Assoc. Press, High
Court Expands Reach of Eminent Domain, Fox NEWS, June 23, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly story/0,3566,160479,00.htm
9
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ers' land under an economic redevelopment plan was con-
stitutional under the Fifth Amendment. 
4 2
Analyzing the Kelo Decision
After writing the majority opinion in Kelo, Justice
John Paul Stevens attempted to set himself apart from the
decision, calling the outcome "unwise," but qualifying his
statement by adding that "the law compelled a result that
[he] would have opposed if [he] were a legislator."43 De-
spite Justice Stevens' misgivings, his majority opinion
began by emphasizing the Court's limited scope of review
and deference to legislative determinations of public use for
eminent domain. 44 The Court determined that the Plan at
issue "unquestionably serves a public purpose," thereby'
meeting the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement.
Specifically, the Court stated that "[p]romoting economic
development is a [longstanding objective] of government"
and that "there is . . . no other principled way of distin-
guishing economic development from . . . other public
purposes." 46 The Court explained that holding the benefits
derived from NLDC's Plan as an invalid public use would
be "incongruous" from its prior takings jurisprudence.47
Aside from sustaining NLDC's takings as constitu-
tional, the Court refused to adopt the petitioner's proposed
bright-line rule that would automatically invalidate eco-
42 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005). The
majority included Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kennedy. Id. at 470.
43 Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails),
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at Al.
44 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482-83.451 d. at 484. (noting that other factors justifying the validity of their
result, including extensive deliberation prior to the Plan's adoption and
statutory authorization for this Plan in Connecticut).46 Id. at 484.
47 1d. at 485; see, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
10
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nomic development as a public use. 48 Thus, the Kelo ma-
jority rejected the petitioner's contention that "eminent
domain for economic development impermissibly blurs the
boundary between public and private takings.",49 Again, the
Court deferred to its past jurisprudence and noted that it
"'cannot say ... public ownership is the sole method of
promoting the public purposes of . . . redevelopment
projects."' 50 The majority's decision focused solely on the
Plan's purpose and its attendant takings, not the mechanics
required to implement the Plan or the takings.
51
Essentially, the Court, through a five-person majori-
ty, openly sanctioned the ancillary private use of property
taken by eminent domain, if the public purpose behind the
taking is constitutional and if the property's development
occurs within the parameters of a redevelopment plan.
52
The Framers of the Constitution likely never intended emi-
nent domain as a mechanism to take private land for a pur-
ported (even incidental) public purpose and later allow
another private party to benefit directly from the taking.
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the
deprivation of private property without due process of law
or without just compensation. 53  This opinion militates
against the Framers' intent of the Fifth Amendment, specif-
48 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485; see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36 (noting
that economic redevelopment can be a valid public use).49 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485.
50 Id. at 486 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34) (emphasis added).
51 See id. at 489 ("Once the question of... purpose has been decided,
the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the
need for a particular tract ... rests in the discretion of the legislative
branch.").
52 Id. at 486-87 (noting that the Court will not examine any hypothetical
case in which a condemning authority transfers land from one private
citizen to another for the purpose of increasing the property's produc-
tivity, even though they would substantiate the petitioner's bright-line
rule prohibiting economic development as a public use).
53 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 (prohibiting deprivation of a person's
property without due process of law or just compensation).
11
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ically the Takings Clause, and runs contrary to the idea that
eminent domain takings should benefit all citizens.
The remainder of Kelo's majority opinion continued
the litany of deference by reiterating that legislative deci-
sions on public use are paramount, and that the Court is an
improper forum to debate the wisdom of a taking or the
plan behind it.54 In sum, the Court's majority validated
NLDC's Plan, the takings, and the stated public purposes
through a form of rational-basis review.55 Not surprisingly,
Justice Stevens would be eager to distance himself from
such a broad pronouncement of power under the Takings
Clause, especially if he was a legislator.56
Compared to the majority opinion, Justice Kenne-
dy's concurrence and the dissenting opinions in Kelo are
more realistic.57 Justice Kennedy strongly criticized the
majority's deferential treatment of NLDC' s takings and the
stated public purposes behind them, calling them "inciden-
tal or pretextual. ' '58 Validating takings based on "incidental
or pretextual public benefits," he writes, is expressly for-
bidden by the Constitution.59 Accordingly, Justice Kenne-
dy determined that a proactive inquiry into an economic
development plan's public purpose is needed to discover
whether the benefits conferred on the private parties are
merely incidental, contrary to the usual standard of ration-
al-basis deference. 60 Justice Kennedy concurred with the
majority that a presumptive invalidity of public purpose for
54 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-90.
55 Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This deferential standard of
review echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic regula-
tion under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses...
56 See Greenhouse, supra note 43, at Al.
57 Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo highlights his significance as
a "swing-vote" because he voted with the majority to sustain NLDC's
taking as constitutional but also filed a separate concurrence justifying
his decision.58 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59 
Id.
60 Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
12
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economic development plans is unwarranted; however, his
opinion was sage enough to advocate against a standard
that could allow for widespread takings of private land
under pretextual or incidental public purposes. 6 1 Kenne-
dy's opinion demonstrated an apparent understanding that
legislative pronouncements on public uses often occur with
little public input or meaningful thought. 62
The Kelo decision yielded two strong dissenting
opinions by Justices O'Connor 63 and Thomas, 64 respective-
ly. First, the O'Connor dissent, joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, focused on the ma-
jority's essential obliteration of "any distinction between
private and public use" under the Fifth Amendment.
65
Essentially, Justice O'Connor determined that the majority
opinion allows "incidental public benefits" derived from
economic redevelopment to serve the same function as a
direct public use, contrary to the Fifth Amendment's public
use clause. 66  Specifically, Justice O'Connor noted that
Berman and Midkiff, which the majority relied on, involved
a taking that conferred a direct public benefit. 67 Since direct
public benefits resulted from those takings, returning the
taken property to private individuals was inconsequential.6 s
The Court correctly sustained the takings and their public
purposes in those direct benefit cases.69 With the Kelo
takings, the lack of a direct relationship between the public
purpose of NLDC's Plan and public benefit conferred con-
sternated the dissenting justices. As a property rights advo-
61 Id. at 493.
62 Id.
61 Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissenters were Justices
O'Connor, Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
65 Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
66 id.
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cate, this author joins Justice O'Connor's condemnation of
the majority's permissive posture of allowing an indirect
public purpose to serve the textual and direct public pur-
pose required by the Fifth Amendment for takings.
Justice Thomas's dissent complements Justice
O'Connor's dissent by addressing a strictly textual and
historical interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. 70  This
dissent used a detailed overview of the extensive judicial
history and precedents underlying takings cases and ex-
plained how the Court's prior takings jurisprudence has led
it to the current (and arguably incorrect) result in Kelo.
71
Interestingly, both dissenting opinions noted that the eco-
nomically poor of society will shoulder the constant threat
of having their property taken and redistributed to more
affluent and politically astute persons for redevelopment
under a likely incidental or pretextual "public purpose."
72
In short, the Kelo dissenters highlighted the majori-
ty opinion's shortcomings and warned those who read Kelo
that the Court's most recent pronouncement on takings will
impact landowners in a way never contemplated by the
Fifth Amendment. The effect of Kelo is akin to the erosion
of a hillside that will eventually cause a landslide on unsus-
pecting landowners. This author agrees with the dissenting
justices in using eminent domain to obtain a direct public
70 See id. at 506, 511, 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the
public use restriction in the Fifth Amendment means that the taken
private property is actually employed for a direct public good instead of
some merely conceivable public benefit (e.g. increased taxes)). This
dissent advocates a return to the plain textual meaning of the Takings
Clause, which is evidenced by Justice Thomas's dedication to strictly
construing the text, in a manner similar to Justice Hugo Black. See id.
at 523.
71 Id. at 512-18.
72 Id. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 521-22 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (specifically noting Justice Thomas's reference to the 'dis-
crete and insular minorities"' of United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), that would be directly affected by the
majority's holding in Kelo).
14
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benefit and with Justice Kennedy insofar that a more in-
depth inquiry is needed for economic redevelopment plans
and their alleged direct public purposes under the Fifth
Amendment. Tennessee, like many other states, unders-
tood Kelo's potential impact on eminent domain and the
concerns of the dissenting justices. Under intense electoral
pressure, Tennessee changed its takings law to counteract
Kelo and its future implications.
Tennessee's Legislative Response to Kelo v. City of New
London
During the 2006 legislative session, the Tennessee
General Assembly enacted Public Chapter 863 to revise
Tennessee's eminent domain statutes. 73  In changing the
law, the General Assembly responded to constituents' de-
mands that Tennessee revise its antiquated eminent domain
law to prevent a Kelo-type scenario from occurring. 74 Pub-
lic Chapter 863 addressed several different areas, including
the legislative intent for eminent domain, the definition of
public purpose, and the revision of specific eminent domain
procedures.
75
The Tennessee General Assembly began its statuto-
ry revisions by declaring that eminent domain should "be
used sparingly" and that a narrow construction of the emi-
nent domain statutes was required to prevent any uninten-
73 See Scott Griswold, Property Rights vs. Public Use, TENN. B.J., Feb.
2007, at 14, 15.
74 For ease of reference, I will reference the Tennessee Code Annotated
section affected by Public Chapter 863 when discussing the changes to
Tennessee's eminent domain law.
75 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (Supp. 2007) (stating the General
Assembly's intent on the appropriate use of eminent domain); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007) (defining both eminent domain
and public use for the purposes of eminent domain); See e.g., TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-17-903(c) (Supp. 2007) (amending the time period for
the "quick-take" procedure from five days to thirty days, among other
procedural changes enacted by Public Chapter 863).
15
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tional enlargement of the state's ability to take private land
for public purposes. 76 This statute is the General Assem-
bly's statement of legislative intent for eminent domain. In
an interview with State Senator Doug Jackson, he ex-
plained that the recent changes were a reactionary response
that attempted to balance the concerns of those who feared
that Kelo would occur in Tennessee, such as the Tennessee
Farm Bureau, and those fearing that the General Assem-
bly's response to Kelo would unduly narrow eminent do-
main, such as local governments. 77 Senator Jackson
estimated that Public Chapter 863 represents the final com-
promise between several dozen bills filed immediately after
Kelo and should effectively prevent any Kelo-type scena-
rios from occurring in Tennessee.
78
Next, Public Chapter 863 attempted to define both
eminent domain and what constitutes public use for emi-
nent domain purposes. 79 Interestingly, this aspect of Ten-
nessee's eminent domain law was notably absent for many
years. 80 The statute first defines eminent domain as "the
authority conferred upon the government ... to condemn
and take.., private property... so long as the property is
taken for a legitimate public use." 81 Public use is then
76 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (Supp. 2007).
77 Telephone Interview with State Sen. Doug Jackson, representing the
2 5th Senatorial District and sponsor of S.B. 3296, the parent legislation
of Public Chapter 863 (Mar. 19, 2007).
78 id.
79 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007); see also Griswold,
supra note 73, at 15-16.
80 See Griswold, supra note 73, at 15.
81 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(1) (Supp. 2007); see TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 21 ("[N]o man's particular ... property taken, or applied to
public use... without just compensation...."). Interestingly, Section
102 states that a legitimate public use must be "in accordance with the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, the
Constitution of Tennessee, Art. 1, §21, and the provisions of chapter
863 of the Public Acts of 2006," as codified in the Tennessee Code
Annotated. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(1) (Supp. 2007).
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defined broadly and negatively as follows: "[direct] private
use or benefit, or the indirect public benefits resulting from
private economic development and private commercial
enterprise, including increased tax revenue and increased
employment opportunity" are not public uses for eminent
domain. 82 Through this language, the General Assembly
responded directly to Kelo by defining public use for emi-
nent domain in terms of the Court's most recent pro-
nouncement of what is acceptable as a public purpose for
taking private land.83
Aside from the public use definition, the revisions
included exceptions that permitted takings for traditional
public purposes (e.g. roads and highways); common carri-
ers and other utilities; housing authorities or community
development agencies; and industrial parks.8 4  Another
revision in this statute provided that private property taken
pursuant to an urban renewal or redevelopment plan must
occur to eliminate a "blighted area." 85 "Blighted area" is
defined under Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-20-
201(a) as an "[area] (including slum areas) with buildings
or other improvements" that are detrimental to, inter alia,
the overall "welfare of the community" because of the
statutory reasons therein. 86 The statute also exempted
82 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007).
83 See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(defining acceptable public uses for eminent domain).
84 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2)(A)-(C), (E) (Supp. 2007).
85 Id. at (2)(C).
86 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007) (stating
that "[w]elfare of the community does not include solely a loss of
property value to surrounding properties... [or] the need for increased
tax revenues" as sufficient justifications to deem the property blighted),
with Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494, 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting
Justice O'Connor's concern of taking property so that government can
upgrade the property and get more revenue from it via taxes).
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farmland used in agricultural production from the definition
of blight.87
Despite the General Assembly's best efforts, only
judicial interpretation of this broad and vague standard of
public use will dictate its effectiveness for preventing Kelo-
type takings. 88 Litigious landowners can litigate the true
meaning of the broad and vague definition of blighted
area,89 or whether a government project causing a taking is
actually conferring a direct public benefit. 90 Adverse ef-
fects on poorer neighborhoods and less affluent property
owners are likely thanks to these recent changes in the law
because they are often subjected to redevelopment plans
similar to those in Kelo and Berman.
91
In addition to the obvious effects discussed above, a
concern exists that the recent changes still permit the very
mechanisms that caused Kelo: takings by economic redeve-
lopment agencies conferring only indirect public benefits.
92
The statute prohibits taking for private development that
has indirect public benefits as their public use justification;
however, takings by redevelopment agencies are still ac-
cepted by the revised statute. 93 These plans often include
private developers as the catalyst to fulfill the plan. This
issue causes consternation because a close reading of the
revised statute appears to leave open a possibility for
another Kelo type taking in Tennessee, despite the General
87 TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-105(2)(A) (Supp. 2007) (defining agricul-
ture and agricultural uses); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp.
2007).
88 See Griswold, supra note 73, at 17 (reaching the same prediction as
the author for these recent legislative changes).
89 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007).
90 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007).
91 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505, 521-22 (O'Connor and Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting) (mirroring the same arguments of a disproportionate impact
on less affluent and prosperous people through the majority's opinion
in the case); Griswold, supra note 73, at 16-17.
92 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007).
9' Id. at (2)(C).
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Assembly's efforts to "cure" the problems caused by Kelo
and rendering the new public use definition ineffective.
Another concern arises out of the statutory revi-
sions. Putting aside the issue of whether a taking confers a
direct public benefit, one of the public use exceptions states
that "private use that is merely incidental to a public use" is
a permissible public use, as long as the land condemned is
not "primarily .. . [for] the incidental private use."9 4 This
exception appears to impute an intent requirement into
takings law that was previously unknown (and likely never
intended) in eminent domain.
For example, suppose a city takes thirty acres of
land for a new park. This city is economically impove-
rished and often lacks tax revenues. When the city takes
the property through eminent domain, the city intends to
develop the park, as its stated public purpose for the taking.
Everyone knows, however, that the money will never be
there to fulfill the project. The land is held for several
years with no progress made towards the park (i.e. the pub-
lic purpose for the taking). Eventually, the county sells the
condemned property to a private company that later devel-
ops the land into a new car factory, which generates new
jobs and added tax revenues. 95 The park never materializ-
es, but the city has a new employer and revenue source.
The preceding example demonstrates that private
property can be taken for a (purported) public purpose and
later turned over to a private developer as an "incidental"
use because the primary purpose for taking the land initial-
94 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2)(D) (Supp. 2007).
95 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-1003(a) (Supp. 2007) (stating
that when "land acquired by eminent domain" is subsequently disposed
of by a condemning authority "to another public or quasi-public entity
or to a private person, corporation, or other entity," fair market value
for the property or better must be received by the transferor), with GA.
CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(b) (Supp. 2007) (providing that no conversion of
property "for any use other than a public use" shall take place until
twenty years after the initial taking).
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ly was a permissible public use. The private use for the
property did not arise until several years later and is merely
incidental to changing times, economics, and political
priorities. Essentially, the exception could gut the newly
enacted public use definition because an intent requirement
is superimposed on the public use definition. A govern-
mental body can potentially take land intending it for a
public use, only to never have the means to fulfill the pur-
pose and later sell the property off to private individuals as
an "incidental" occurrence to the taking. The transfer
would fulfill the statute's literal requirements for public
use, but would circumvent the legislative intent behind
eminent domain. Thus, this process would render the pub-
lic use definition meaningless because the actual events
would run totally contrary to the statutory language.
96
Challenging takings based on this scenario would require a
showing of bad faith regarding the government's intent
behind the initial taking and subsequent property transfer to
a private individual (i.e. the proof would require that the
governmental body took private land by eminent domain
and then transferred it to another private party, knowing
that the taking's public purpose would never materialize at
the time of the original taking).
97
An example of how Public Chapter 863 revised
specific eminent domain procedures is evidenced by the
revision of the "quick-take" procedure for public agency
takings. Prior to 2006, a condemning authority in Tennes-
see, such as the Department of Transportation, could give a
96 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007) (noting that these
takings of land for an intended public use, selling to a private party, and
then enjoying the indirect public benefits derived from the private
development run directly contrary to the language of indirect public
benefits caused by private developments and shall not be a public use
for eminent domain).
9 7 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (noting that the
petitioner's failure to demonstrate intent on the part of the government
by concrete evidence proved fatal to their case).
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landowner only five days notice before being entitled to
physical possession of the property pursuant to its power of
condemnation. 98 The revised law now requires the con-
demning authority to give the landowner a thirty-day notice
before taking possession of the property. 99 Based on per-
sonal work experience, the thirty-day notice requirement
benefits landowners by giving them time to plan for the
imminent condemnation and devise an appropriate re-
sponse. The condemning authority also benefits because it
litigates dozens of other condemnation actions concurrently
that require an equal amount of attention. 100 Despite con-
tentions that this added time will only delay eminent do-
main litigation, practitioners on both sides will likely agree
that the marginal cost is outweighed by the added benefits
of the extra time in the interest of fairness and justice.
In closing, the recent changes to Tennessee's emi-
nent domain law will have far-reaching implications for
Tennessee practitioners. Aside from litigation over specific
procedural issues, such as how to correctly value the con-
demned property, broader issues dealing with a taking's
constitutionality will likely occur due to the formulation of
a more narrow and vague public use definition, including
98 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-803(b) (2005). The "quick-take" proce-
dure most often involves land acquisitions for highway right-of-ways;
however, this type of taking is one of the most common uses of emi-
nent domain in Tennessee.
99 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-903(c) (Supp. 2007). This statute applies
to situations in which the private landowners are not contesting con-
demnation and the private landowners contest either the condemnation
itself or the amount of just compensation due to them for the taking.
Note that Part 8 of the statute, dealing with the "quick-take" procedure
was moved to Part 9 of the Tennessee Code following the 2006 statuto-
0revisions.
The author has clerked for two summers for the Tennessee Attorney
General's Office in the Real Property Division and has handled con-
demnation litigation for the State of Tennessee.
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what constitutes "incidental private use" or a "blighted
area."
101
Tennessee's Sister States Follow the Kelo Revision
Movement
After the Court's decision in Kelo, states bordering
Tennessee have reformed their eminent domain laws in a
similar fashion. This section of this essay will briefly dis-
cuss the efforts of Kentucky, Georgia, and Alabama in
reforming eminent domain as a comparison of how Tennes-
see's sister states are counteracting Kelo. 10 2 This section
will compare each examined sister-state's definition of
public use, blight, legislative intent, and other notable in-




Kentucky is the first sister state examined regarding
its post-Kelo eminent domain changes. During the 2006
legislative session, Kentucky revised its eminent domain
statute to specifically define public use and prohibit emi-
101 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007) (defining ac-
ceptable public uses for eminent domain); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-
20 1(a) (Supp. 2007) (dealing with the definition of blight).
102 See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 State
Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/emindomainleg06.htm (last vi-
sited Sept. 18, 2007) (highlighting the recent efforts among various
states to change their respective eminent domain statutes in light of
Kelo).
103 See also Carol J. Miller & Stanley A. Leasure, Post-Kelo Determi-
nation of Public Use and Eminent Domain in Economic Development
Under Arkansas Law, 59 ARK. L. REv. 43, 43 (2006) (discussing
Arkansas's revisions to eminent domain after Kelo); Dale A. Whitman,
Eminent Domain Reform in Missouri: A Legislative Memoir, 71 MO. L.
REv. 721, 721 (2006) (discussing Missouri's statutory revisions after
Kelo).
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nent domain for economic development projects providing
only an incidental public benefit as the validating public
purpose. 10 4  Kentucky and Tennessee's eminent domain
statutes are similar, in that both statutes define acceptable
public uses justifying eminent domain and limit incidental
private uses of taken land to those that do not result in tak-
ing private land solely for incidental private use. 10 5 Ken-
tucky, like Tennessee, declared that the legislative intent
for eminent domain is that it should "be used sparingly"
and only for the benefit of all the citizens within the
state.106 One interesting point concerning Kentucky's re-
cent eminent domain revisions is the exemption for land
acquisitions financed by state or federal road funds. 07 The
constitutionality of taking land for a plainly public purpose,
such as a road, would not likely be questioned, but a few
situations exist in which takings for roads and highways




The next state examined is Georgia and its 2006
Landowner's Bill of Rights and Private Property Protection
Act.'0 9 Georgia, like Tennessee, enacted both specific
procedural changes for eminent domain takings and specif-
ic definitions for acceptable public uses justifying eminent
104 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
105 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(2) (LexisNexis Supp.
2007), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007).
106 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007),
with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (Supp. 2007).
107 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
108 One conceivable situation that could trigger this exemption in Ken-
tucky is when a highway project is funded but never completed, and the
property is used later for a private development.
9 See 2006 Ga. Laws, Ch. 444 (serving as Georgia's form of compre-
hensive statutory eminent domain reform).
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domain. 110 However, Georgia's statutory revisions differ
from Tennessee's in two respects. First, Tennessee's pub-
lic use definition is more straightforward than Georgia's
definition. Tennessee's definition for public use is con-
tained in one straightforward provision, whereas Georgia's
definition is scattered over several different code provi-
sions.111 In addition, Georgia included both private benefit
and indirect public benefit in the definition of economic
development and summarily stated that "[t]he public bene-
fit of economic development shall not constitute a public
use."'112 Tennessee took the opposite approach and clearly
stated what constitutes an acceptable public use for eminent
domain, albeit negatively, and notwithstanding excep-
tions. 113
Second, Georgia's definition of blight is more re-
strictive than Tennessee's because Georgia requires that
two or more of the statutorily enumerated conditions exist
before a property is termed "blighted" for eminent domain
purposes. 114 Tennessee has a more inclusive standard for
blight, where a property meeting just one of the require-
ments is determined blighted, including the overly broad
"welfare of the community" standard.115 Interestingly, both
states prohibited a finding of blight for eminent domain
purposes solely because a property causes the surrounding
property values to decline because of its aesthetic condi-
tion. 116 Arguably, both states have equally strong defini-
11Oid.
111 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(9)(A) (Supp. 2007), and GA.
CODE ANN. § 22-1-2 (Supp. 2007), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-
102(2) (Supp. 2007).
112 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(4), (9)(B) (Supp. 2007).
113 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007).
114 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(1) (Supp. 2007) (noting the conditions for
findings of blight on the property being uninhabitable, abandoned,
environmentally hazardous, or conducive to ill health or disease).
115 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007).
116 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(1) (Supp. 2007), with TENN.
CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007).
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tions of blight and public use; however, the outcome of
litigation will determine their effectiveness.
Georgia, like Tennessee, takes a comparable posi-
tion on the legislative intent behind eminent domain be-
cause both states declare that eminent domain is solely for
public usages.1 17 Georgia's recent revisions included lan-
guage allowing a landowner to reclaim his property (i.e.
right of first refusal) or receive additional compensation if
the "property acquired through the power of eminent do-
main from an owner fails to be put to a public use within
five years." 118 Tennessee has a similar provision; however,
the procedure is quite complex. 
119
In sum, Georgia has enacted equally forceful emi-
nent domain revisions to curb Kelo's negative effects.
Tennessee could easily duplicate some of Georgia's inno-
vative revisions to eminent domain, such as defining blight
based on a specific condition/factor test.
Alabama
Alabama is the last of Tennessee's sister-states that
this paper examines regarding recent eminent domain
changes after Kelo. Alabama's reforms parallel Tennes-
see's revisions in defining public use and legislative intent
117 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(a) (Supp. 2007) ("[N]either this
state nor any political subdivision... shall use eminent domain unless
it is for public use.... ."), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (Supp.
2006).
118 See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(c)(1) (Supp. 2007). Specifically, the
property is considered put to a public use when a "substantial good
faith effort has been expended.., to put the property to public use,"
regardless of whether the project is completed. While a very worth-
while provision for landowners, the provision is flexible and could
prove to be heavily litigated.
9 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-1003 (Supp. 2007) (dealing with the
disposal of land acquired by eminent domain); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-
2-112 (2005) (dealing with the disposal of surplus interests in real
property held by the state).
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governing eminent domain. 12  First, Alabama's statutory
revisions prohibited the use of "eminent domain to transfer
private property for 'purposes of private retail, office,
commercial, industrial, or residential development."
' 121
The revisions further prohibited local condemning authori-
ties from using eminent domain to increase tax revenues or
from transferring taken private property to anyone except
purely governmental entities. 122 Thus, Alabama's legisla-
tive intent, though not explicitly defined, appears to be that
eminent domain is a tool to be used strictly for the public
welfare. Both Tennessee and Alabama have public use
definitions that are comparable in their effect; however,
Alabama used more explicit language to define an accepta-
ble public use under eminent domain. 
123
In addition, Alabama's statutory revisions, like
Tennessee's, permit the taking and transferring of private
property that is termed blighted, under statutory formula-
tions, to private entities under a redevelopment plan.
124
Alabama's revisions also include a buyback provision for
landowners who lose their property via eminent domain if
the property never materializes into a public use. 125 This
120 See Anastasia C. Sheffier-Wood, Where Do We Go from Here?
States Revise Eminent Domain Legislation in Response to Kelo, 79
TEMP. L. REv. 617, 631-32 (2006) (evaluating Alabama's changes to
its eminent domain laws). Compare ALA. CODE §§ 18-1B-1-2 (Lexis-
Nexis 2006), with TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-17-101-102 (Supp. 2006)
(determining legislative purpose and defining public use for eminent
domain).
121 See Sheffler-Wood, supra note 120, at 631.
122 id.
123 Compare ALA. CODE § 18-1B-2 (LexisNexis 2007), with TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007).124 See ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(c) (LexisNexis 2007). Compare ALA.
CODE § 18-IB-2 (LexisNexis 2007), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-
102 (Supp. 2007).
125 Compare ALA. CODE § 18-1B-2(b) (LexisNexis 2007) (stating that
the right of first refusal in the buyback provision goes to the landowner
whom the condemning authority acquired the property from via emi-
nent domain), with GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(c)(1) (Supp. 2007) (stat-
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provision is similar to Georgia's right of first refusal and
Tennessee's buyback provisions; however, Alabama does
not appear have a time limitation on this buyback provi-
sion.
126
In sum, Alabama, like Tennessee, appears to have
revised its eminent domain law to prevent a Kelo-type
situation from occurring, but testing the effectiveness of the
revisions will occur only through future eminent domain
litigation, as is the case in every other state currently revis-
ing its eminent domain statutes.
Conclusion
Aside from the critical look at Kelo and the compar-
ison of eminent domain revisions between Tennessee and
its sister states, the recent revisions to Tennessee's eminent
domain law yield several conclusions. First, adding specif-
ic definitions for public use, blight, and eminent domain
afford Tennessee landowners some certainty for under-
standing what purposes the government can take their land
under the power of eminent domain. Until recently, local
governments could determine what constituted a valid
public purpose for taking land under eminent domain sua
sponte.127 The addition of a quasi-specific public use defi-
nition should aid both condemning authorities and lan-
downers in determining when eminent domain takings are
appropriate and prevent the possibility of another Kelo
occurrence. The criticism is that the public use definition is
still sufficiently vague and unascertainable, thereby afford-
ing the government flexibility in taking property in many
ing that the former landowner can apply to condemning authority to
regain property taken by eminent domain if property is not put to a
public use within five years of its taking).
6 ALA. CODE § 18-1B-2(b) (LexisNexis 2007).
127 See Griswold, supra note 73, at 16 (noting that prior to the 2006
revisions, "counties could use eminent domain 'for any county pur-
pose' deemed appropriate).
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cases. This flexibility in takings could be shown when an
intended public use eventually yields to an "incidental"
private use after the taking or when an economic redeve-
lopment plan uses eminent domain and private develop-
ment to achieve some indirect public use essentially
sanctioned by the statute.
Second, the revision of the "quick-take" procedure
affords a greater degree of fairness to landowners and con-
demning authorities alike. By increasing the notice of a
proposed taking to thirty days, both sides have a better
opportunity to evaluate the facts and handle the dispute in a
mutually beneficial manner. This broadened time frame
will hopefully alleviate litigation and encourage settlements
of takings cases outside of court. 128
Finally, the eminent domain revisions are far from
complete. Changes will likely be forthcoming to the emi-
nent domain laws in the future, as time passes and circums-
tances change with litigation. Overall, the recent changes
enacted by Tennessee to its eminent domain law in 2006
have likely offset any potential adverse effect created by
the Kelo decision, ifjust by the simple fact that the changes
to the law have put the electorate on notice that eminent
domain is regarded for strictly public purposes.
The recent changes to our eminent domain law
would help protect our hypothetical grandmother, intro-
duced at the beginning of this paper, and prevent her land
from becoming another Kelo type taking. These changes
represent progress towards a balance between the govern-
ment's need and right to take private land for public use
and a landowner's right to enjoy property without the threat
of unwarranted government seizure.
128 In this author's experience with eminent domain cases, many con-
dermnation actions are eventually settled out of court, but this increase
notice period of thirty days will hopefully facilitate a greater number of
settlements. Many landowners, when confronted with losing their
property, often become upset easily or become irrational if forced into a
quick decision on compensation or other matters related to the taking.
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